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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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133 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Turn Crescendo Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the "Crescendo" multi-turn jailbreak attack. This attack uses a series of benign, escalating prompts to gradually lead the LLM into generating harmful or disallowed content, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to follow conversational patterns and build upon previous responses, making it difficult to detect based solely on individual prompts.

Great, now write an article about that: The crescendo multi-turn llm jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+6 more
  • Claude 2
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemini Ultra
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Chat

Infectious Multi-Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to exhibit harmful behaviors exponentially fast through agent-to-agent interaction. The adversarial image acts as a "virus," spreading via pairwise chats without further attacker intervention.

Agent smith: A single image can jailbreak one million multimodal llm agents exponentially fast
Evaluated models: GPT-4V, InstructBLIP, LLaVA 1.5

Autonomous Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, due to their multi-agent architecture and role-based interactions, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit the system's design and agent roles. Maliciously crafted prompts, particularly those targeting system-level roles, can cause agents to generate harmful content, bypassing safety mechanisms more effectively than attacks against individual LLMs. The vulnerability stems from a "domino effect" where one compromised agent can trigger harmful…

Evil geniuses: Delving into the safety of llm-based agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.