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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

521 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Point-based 3D Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically PointLLM and GPT4Point, are vulnerable to white-box, gradient-based adversarial attacks. The vulnerability exists in the model's processing of 3D point cloud data, where an attacker can optimize imperceptible geometric perturbations ($\delta$) on the input point cloud ($x$) to manipulate the model's textual output. The paper identifies two specific attack vectors: 1. Vision Attack: Directly perturbs the high-dimensional visual token…

On the Adversarial Robustness of 3D Large Vision-Language Models
Affects: Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

A malicious model supply chain vulnerability exists involving a technique termed Adversarial Contrastive Learning (ACL) for Large Language Model (LLM) quantization attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to publish a model that appears benign and preserves high utility in full precision (e.g., BF16 or FP32) but exhibits malicious behaviors—such as jailbreak, over-refusal, or advertisement injection—immediately upon zero-shot quantization (e.g., INT8, FP4, or NF4).

Adversarial Contrastive Learning for LLM Quantization Attacks
Affects: Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Affects: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B +1 more

Source: arXiv

The STEP-LLM framework, utilized for generating Computer-Aided Design (CAD) STEP files (ISO 10303) from natural language, exhibits a safety alignment vulnerability during the fine-tuning of base Large Language Models (specifically Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct and Qwen-2.5-3B). The training pipeline employs Depth-First Search (DFS) reserialization and Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Scaled Chamfer Distance rewards to optimize for geometric fidelity and syntactic validity of Boundary Representation…

STEP-LLM: Generating CAD STEP Models from Natural Language with Large Language Models
Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Qwen 2.5 3B

Source: arXiv

Semantic caching mechanisms in LLM applications are vulnerable to cross-tenant cache key collision attacks (CacheAttack) due to the inherent mathematical conflict between locality-preserving fuzzy hashing and cryptographic collision resistance (the avalanche effect). An attacker can leverage gradient-based search algorithms to optimize an adversarial discrete suffix that, when appended to a malicious prompt, forces its output embedding vector to collide with the embedding of a targeted benign…

From Similarity to Vulnerability: Key Collision Attack on LLM Semantic Caching
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, DeepSeek R1

Source: arXiv

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) utilizing Transformer architectures (specifically BERT and T5-based re-rankers) are vulnerable to minimal adversarial perturbations that artificially promote a target document's rank. The vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate ranking outcomes by inserting or substituting a single "query center" token—a word identified as the semantic centroid of the user's query—into the target document. The attack exploits the model's sensitivity to specific semantic…

One Word is Enough: Minimal Adversarial Perturbations for Neural Text Ranking

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "hard-to-falsify" deceptive evidence injection, termed the "Facade of Truth." This vulnerability allows an attacker to override an LLM’s parametric knowledge (internal factual beliefs) by injecting sophisticated, iteratively refined fabricated evidence into the context window. Unlike overt misinformation which models typically reject, this attack utilizes a multi-agent adversarial framework (MisBelief) to generate evidence that mimics…

The Facade of Truth: Uncovering and Mitigating LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence
Affects: GPT-3.5, GPT-5, Llama 3 8B +1 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in trimodal audio-video-language models where an attacker can systematically degrade multimodal reasoning through untargeted, audio-only adversarial perturbations. By optimizing a shared perturbation $\delta$ applied to the audio channel, an attacker can manipulate internal representations—specifically targeting audio encoder embeddings and cross-modal attention mechanisms—without modifying visual or textual inputs. The attack exploits the model's reliance on the audio…

SoundBreak: A Systematic Study of Audio-Only Adversarial Attacks on Trimodal Models
Affects: VideoLLAMA2, Qwen 2 7B Instruct, Whisper Large-v2 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing external tool execution frameworks are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) via the "Tool Stream." Unlike traditional data-stream injections (e.g., malicious emails), this vulnerability exploits the agent's interpretation of functional tool definitions (docstrings, signatures) and runtime feedback (error messages, return values) as binding operational constraints. Adversaries functioning as compromised or malicious tool providers can embed…

VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit
Affects: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Qwen 3 Max

Source: arXiv

A cognitive vulnerability exists in the reasoning mechanisms of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically regarding "narrative overfitting"—the model's intrinsic drive to synthesize coherent causal stories from fragmented inputs. This vulnerability allows for "Cognitive Collusion Attacks" where an attacker creates a fabricated belief state in the victim agent using exclusively factually true evidence fragments. By employing a "Generative Montage" framework (consisting of…

Lying with Truths: Open-Channel Multi-Agent Collusion for Belief Manipulation via Generative Montage
Affects: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Nano +11 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.