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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

539 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

VLM Moral Persuasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct+20 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 2B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct
  • InternVL3 2B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3 38B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 4B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 38B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 7B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 34B
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Semantic-Agnostic Multimodal Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a specific black-box jailbreak evaluation, BVS, in which fragmented visual content is mixed with neutral imagery and paired with reconstruction-oriented text so harmful intent is only recomposed during multimodal reasoning. The authors report that this can bypass input and output safety assumptions in image-generating MLLMs. A safe defensive reproduction should use synthetic, non-harmful stand-ins for prohibited concepts, test whether fragmented cross-modal inputs are…

Beyond Visual Safety: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models for Harmful Image Generation via Semantic-Agnostic Inputs
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Physical Navigation Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Sound Induces Trimodal Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in trimodal audio-video-language models where an attacker can systematically degrade multimodal reasoning through untargeted, audio-only adversarial perturbations. By optimizing a shared perturbation $\delta$ applied to the audio channel, an attacker can manipulate internal representations—specifically targeting audio encoder embeddings and cross-modal attention mechanisms—without modifying visual or textual inputs. The attack exploits the model's reliance on the audio…

SoundBreak: A Systematic Study of Audio-Only Adversarial Attacks on Trimodal Models
Evaluated models: VideoLLAMA2, Qwen 2 7B Instruct, Whisper Large-v2+1 more
  • VideoLLAMA2
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Whisper Large-v2
  • PANNs

Invisible Headline Trading Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA+7 more
  • FinBERT
  • FinGPT
  • FinLLaMA
  • o3
  • o3 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini High
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

MLLM Chart Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Code-generation Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to directed misuse for the generation of misleading data visualizations. This vulnerability, described as the "ChartAttack" framework, allows an attacker to prompt the model to manipulate chart annotation code (e.g., JSON specifications for Matplotlib or Vega-Lite) to apply specific "misleaders"—design choices that distort data interpretation without altering the underlying data values. By…

ChartAttack: Testing the Vulnerability of LLMs to Malicious Prompting in Chart Generation
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 14B, LLaVA 7B, Phi-3

Misleading Option Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) interfaces or choice-based selection structures are vulnerable to Option Injection. By appending a task-irrelevant candidate choice (e.g., Option E) containing a steering directive—specifically utilizing threat framing (penalty coercion) or bonus framing (reward inducement)—an attacker can hijack the model's decision-making process. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in attention allocation: the model's…

OI-Bench: An Option Injection Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Susceptibility to Directive Interference
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Mini, Claude Haiku 4.5+9 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Grok 4.1

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.