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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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122 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

AutoBreach: Wordplay-Guided Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AutoBreach exploits the vulnerability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to wordplay-based adversarial prompts. By leveraging an LLM to generate diverse wordplay mapping rules and employing a two-stage optimization strategy, AutoBreach crafts prompts that bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended responses, even without modifying system prompts. The vulnerability lies in the LLM's susceptibility to semantic manipulation through cleverly disguised inputs.

AutoBreach: Universal and Adaptive Jailbreaking with Efficient Wordplay-Guided Optimization
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+2 more
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Adaptive LLM Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Leading safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. These attacks utilize manually crafted prompt templates, combined with random search on a suffix to maximize the log-probability of a target token indicating compliance (e.g., "Sure"). The attacks are adaptive, as the prompt template and target token are customized for specific models. Furthermore, some models are vulnerable to transfer attacks (using successful prompts from one LLM on…

Jailbreaking leading safety-aligned llms with simple adaptive attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 2.0, Claude 2.1, Claude 3 Haiku+14 more
  • Claude 2.0
  • Claude 2.1
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Gemma 7B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama-2-chat-70B
  • Llama 3-instruct 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Nemotron-4-340B
  • Phi 3 Mini
  • R2D2
  • Vicuna 13B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.