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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Few-Shot Weakens Task Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) safety alignment mechanisms where the combination of Task-Oriented Prompts (ToP) and few-shot demonstrations significantly degrades defense effectiveness against jailbreak attacks. When few-shot examples (in-context learning) are appended to system prompts that explicitly define safety as a task objective (ToP), the model's attention to the safety instruction is diluted due to the "lost in the middle" phenomenon and attention entropy growth…

How Few-shot Demonstrations Affect Prompt-based Defenses Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, DeepSeek V3, Qwen 2.5 7B

LLM Judge Coin Flip

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge safety classifiers exhibit severe performance degradation (falling to near-random chance) when subjected to distribution shifts caused by adversarial prompt optimization (Attack Shift), varying target architectures (Model Shift), and semantic categorization (Data Shift). Adversarial algorithms, particularly sampling-based (Best-of-N) and judge-aware optimization methods (GCG-REINFORCE), explicitly and implicitly exploit these judge insufficiencies. Instead of eliciting…

A Coin Flip for Safety: LLM Judges Fail to Reliably Measure Adversarial Robustness
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B HarmBench, Llama Guard 3 8B, AegisGuard+1 more
  • Llama 2 13B HarmBench
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • AegisGuard
  • JailJudge

AI Persuasion Trust Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Adversarial Explanation Attacks (AEAs) introduce a behavioral vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) based decision-support systems where the communication channel between the AI and the user is exploited to induce trust in incorrect model predictions. By manipulating the framing of an explanation—specifically its reasoning mode, evidence type, communication style, and presentation format—an attacker can dissociate the perceived plausibility of an explanation from its factual correctness…

When AI Persuades: Adversarial Explanation Attacks on Human Trust in AI-Assisted Decision Making
Evaluated models: Llama 3.3 70B

LLM Backdoor Trigger Reconstruction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) subjected to Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) are vulnerable to "sleeper agent" data poisoning attacks. An attacker injects specific trigger phrases into the training corpus, causing the model to learn a conditional policy: behaving normally for standard inputs but executing a malicious target behavior when the trigger is present. These backdoors persist through safety training and alignment. The vulnerability stems from the model's strong memorization of poisoning…

The Trigger in the Haystack: Extracting and Reconstructing LLM Backdoor Triggers
Evaluated models: Gemma 3 270M IT, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, Phi-4 Mini Instruct+4 more
  • Gemma 3 270M IT
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • Phi-4 Mini Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Phi-4 Reasoning Plus
  • Llama 2 7B Backdoor DEPLOYMENT
  • OpenHermes 13B Backdoor DEPLOYMENT

MCP Description-Code Inconsistency

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) architecture lacks a semantic verification mechanism to enforce consistency between a tool's documented behavior (exposed to the Large Language Model via JSON schemas) and its actual executable logic. This design gap allows MCP Servers to present benign, read-only, or limited-scope descriptions to the LLM agent while implementing undocumented, privileged, or state-mutating functionality in the underlying code. An attacker can exploit this description–code…

Don't believe everything you read: Understanding and Measuring MCP Behavior under Misleading Tool Descriptions
Evaluated models: Not reported

Token Position Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the positional sensitivity of adversarial tokens. Existing gradient-based attacks, such as the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), conventionally append adversarial tokens as a suffix to the user prompt. This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety alignment mechanisms with significantly higher success rates by optimizing adversarial tokens as a prefix (GCG-Prefix) or relocating existing adversarial suffixes to…

Beyond Suffixes: Token Position in GCG Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Tag-Along Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in tool-augmented Large Language Model (LLM) agents characterized as "Tag-Along Attacks," where an unprivileged external user (or adversarial agent) coerces a safety-aligned Operator agent into executing prohibited tool calls. Unlike Indirect Prompt Injection, this attack targets the direct conversational interface using a technique termed "Imperative Overloading." By mimicking system prompt syntax and utilizing high-priority imperative commands (e.g., "Strict adherence…

David vs. Goliath: Verifiable Agent-to-Agent Jailbreaking via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct AWQ, DeepSeek V3.1, Gemini 2.5 Flash+9 more
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct AWQ
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Meta-SecAlign 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct AWQ
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct AWQ
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Claude 3 Haiku

Covert Grade Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for Automatic Short Answer Grading (ASAG) are vulnerable to the "GradingAttack" framework, which employs fine-grained adversarial manipulation to alter grading outcomes. Attackers can leverage two distinct strategies: (1) Prompt-level attacks using role-play injection strings that instruct the model to pretend an answer is correct regardless of factual accuracy, and (2) Token-level attacks utilizing gradient-based optimization (similar to Greedy Coordinate…

GradingAttack: Attacking Large Language Models Towards Short Answer Grading Ability
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

UltraBreak Universal VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a universal and transferable adversarial attack dubbed "UltraBreak." This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass safety alignment filters and elicit harmful responses (e.g., hate speech, dangerous instructions) by supplying a single, specifically crafted adversarial image alongside a text query. Unlike traditional gradient-based attacks that optimize for specific token sequences (cross-entropy loss) and result in brittle…

Toward Universal and Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen VL Chat, Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct+6 more
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • LLaVA v1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Kimi VL A3B Instruct
  • GLM-4.1V 9B Thinking
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Claude 3 Haiku

Activation Delta Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Activation-delta-based linear probes used for detecting task drift and prompt injections in Large Language Models (LLMs) can be bypassed using universal adversarial suffixes. By utilizing the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm, an attacker can generate a single, optimized suffix that simultaneously fools multiple logistic regression classifiers attached to different hidden layers of the LLM. The attack jointly optimizes the suffix tokens by accumulating gradients from the losses of all…

Bypassing Prompt Injection Detectors through Evasive Injections
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Phi-3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.