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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Query-Agnostic Retrieval Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Model-based Retrieval (LLMR) systems allows attackers to intentionally hide specific documents from being retrieved (e.g., in RAG pipelines or search engines) by appending a small number of adversarially crafted, query-agnostic tokens. The attack operates in a complete black-box setting: it requires no knowledge of the victim's queries, the target retrieval model's parameters, or the underlying document corpus. By utilizing Document-Query Adversarial (DQ-A)…

" Someone Hid It": Query-Agnostic Black-Box Attacks on LLM-Based Retrieval
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Semantics-Preserving Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based vulnerability detection systems (used in static application security testing and code review pipelines) are susceptible to semantics-preserving adversarial evasion attacks. Attackers can bypass detection mechanisms by injecting gradient-optimized "universal adversarial strings" into specific code regions—defined as "carriers"—that do not alter the program's compilation or execution logic. These carriers include non-executable regions (code comments, inactive preprocessor directives)…

Syntax- and Compilation-Preserving Evasion of LLM Vulnerability Detectors
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B, Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • CodeAstra
  • StarCoder2 15B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini

Universal MLLM Target Matching

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5

Adaptive Multimodal Reasoning Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper reports a black-box jailbreak evaluation in which a ReAct-style loop adaptively rewrites unsafe text prompts and selectively applies blur, DCT filtering, or recoloring to image regions identified as safety-sensitive. The combined cross-modal strategy is intended to make harmful image-text requests appear less objectionable to a vision-language model while preserving enough semantics to elicit an answer. This is a specific, security-relevant evaluation, although the reported results…

Jailbreaks on Vision Language Model via Multimodal Reasoning
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash

Agent Missing-Tool Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-turn Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed in safety-critical domains (specifically automotive assistants) exhibit a "completion-compliance tension" vulnerability. When agents encounter missing tools, incomplete environment observations, or ambiguous user requests, they prioritize satisfying the user's intent over adhering to defined domain safety policies. This results in two distinct failure modes: (1) Premature Action Execution, where agents execute physical state changes based…

CAR-bench: Evaluating the Consistency and Limit-Awareness of LLM Agents under Real-World Uncertainty
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5+7 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • xLAM 2 32B

Cross-Image Contagion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing interleaved image-text sequences are vulnerable to a universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack known as LAMP. This vulnerability allows an attacker to generate a single, noise-based perturbation pattern using a surrogate model (e.g., Mantis-CLIP) that transfers effectively to black-box target models. The attack leverages two novel loss functions during perturbation learning: a "contagious" objective that manipulates…

LAMP: Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Multi-Image Tasks via Pre-trained Models
Evaluated models: Mantis-CLIP, Mantis-SIGLIP, Mantis-Idefics2+4 more
  • Mantis-CLIP
  • Mantis-SIGLIP
  • Mantis-Idefics2
  • VILA 1.5
  • LLaVA 1.6
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • MiniGPT-4

Pathological Reasoning DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allows attackers to perform Prompt-Induced Inference-Time Denial-of-Service (PI-DoS) attacks by submitting short, semantically coherent adversarial prompts. These prompts, which often take the form of complex logic puzzles with nested dependencies or contradictory constraints, exploit the adaptive computation mechanism of LRMs to force the model into pathologically long, nearly non-terminating intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., generating…

ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Kimi K2 Instruct, DeepSeek R1+8 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • MiniMax M2
  • Nemotron 3 Nano 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Visual Compression Mismatch Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) utilizing visual token compression mechanisms (e.g., VisionZip, VisPruner) to reduce inference latency. The vulnerability stems from an optimization-inference mismatch where standard adversarial defenses assume full-token processing, while the deployed model utilizes a subset of tokens selected via importance metrics (typically attention scores).

On the Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models under Visual Token Compression
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B

Agent Over-Trigger Containment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Autonomous Incident Response (IR) and Security Operations Center (SOC) agents utilizing frontier LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial over-triggering via contextualized prompt injections. When processing untrusted artifacts (such as SQLite logs, alerts, or phishing emails) in a dual-control environment, these agents exhibit a severe calibration failure: they lack action restraint and execute disruptive containment tools prematurely. Attackers can exploit this by embedding T2 (contextualized…

OpenSec: Measuring Incident Response Agent Calibration Under Adversarial Evidence
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2+1 more
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct

Intent-Context Coupling Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3, are vulnerable to an "Intent-Context Coupling" multi-turn jailbreak attack (automated by the ICON framework). The vulnerability arises from an alignment failure where safety constraints are relaxed when a malicious intent is paired with a semantically congruent "authoritative-style" context pattern. By routing specific prohibited intents (e.g., Hacking) to pre-optimized context patterns (e.g., Scientific Research…

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack
Evaluated models: Llama 4 Maverick Instruct, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct, Qwen-Max 2025-01-25+8 more
  • Llama 4 Maverick Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Qwen-Max 2025-01-25
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • GPT-5.1 2025-11-13
  • GPT-4o 2024-11-20
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5 20250929
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • WildGuard

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.