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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

340 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Universal Jailbreak Prompt Generator

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to robust jailbreak prompts generated by the ArrAttack framework. ArrAttack uses a two-stage process: a robustness judgment model trained to identify prompts that bypass existing LLM safety mechanisms, and a robust jailbreak prompt generation model that leverages this information to create highly effective attacks. This allows attackers to bypass multiple defense mechanisms, including perplexity-based detection, input preprocessing, and…

One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

Hidden Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • InternVL 2 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct

Steganographic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A steganographic jailbreak attack, termed StegoAttack, allows bypassing safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by embedding malicious queries within benign-appearing text. The attack hides the malicious query in the first word of each sentence of a seemingly innocuous paragraph, leveraging the LLM's autoregressive generation to process and respond to the hidden query, even when employing encryption in the response.

Hiding in Plain Sight: A Steganographic Approach to Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-5, DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking, Qwen 3 Max Thinking

SAE Interpretability Illusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), utilized for interpreting the internal residual stream activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-understandable concepts, are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. By employing gradient-based optimization techniques adapted for SAEs (specifically a generalized Greedy Coordinate Gradient), an attacker can craft inputs via suffix appending or token replacement that manipulate the SAE's latent feature activations. This vulnerability allows for the…

Interpretability Illusions with Sparse Autoencoders: Evaluating Robustness of Concept Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B

Asynchronous Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

End-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to AudioJailbreak, a novel attack that appends adversarial audio perturbations ("jailbreak audios") to user prompts. These perturbations, even when applied asynchronously and without alignment to the user's speech, can manipulate the LALM's response to generate adversary-desired outputs that bypass safety mechanisms. The attack achieves universality by employing a single perturbation effective across different prompts and robustness…

AudioJailbreak: Jailbreak Attacks against End-to-End Large Audio-Language Models
Evaluated models: BLSP, FunAudioLLM, GPT-4o+9 more
  • BLSP
  • FunAudioLLM
  • GPT-4o
  • Ichigo
  • Llama Omni
  • LLaSM
  • Mini-Omni
  • Mini-Omni 2
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Qwen Audio
  • SALMONN
  • SpeechGPT

Code-Mixed Phonetic Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple large language and multimodal models that allows for the bypass of safety filters through the use of code-mixed prompts with phonetic perturbations. An attacker can craft a prompt in a code-mixed language (e.g., Hinglish) and apply phonetic misspellings to sensitive keywords (e.g., spelling "hate" as "haet"). This technique causes the model's tokenizer to parse the sensitive word into benign sub-tokens, preventing safety mechanisms from flagging the harmful…

" Haet Bhasha aur Diskrimineshun": Phonetic Perturbations in Code-Mixed Hinglish to Red-Team LLMs
Evaluated models: Gemma 1.1 7B IT, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+2 more
  • Gemma 1.1 7B IT
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Single-Query LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, termed ICE (Intent Concealment and Diversion), which leverages hierarchical prompt decomposition and semantic expansion to bypass safety filters. ICE achieves high attack success rates with single queries, exploiting the models' limitations in multi-step reasoning.

Exploring Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs through Intent Concealment and Diversion
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+6 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen Max

On-Device LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Logic-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on token-level distribution analysis are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack exploiting distributional discrepancies between alignment data and formally expressed logical statements. The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass safety restrictions by translating harmful natural language prompts into equivalent first-order logic expressions. The LLM, trained primarily on natural language, fails to recognize the harmful intent…

Logic Jailbreak: Efficiently Unlocking LLM Safety Restrictions Through Formal Logical Expression
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.