Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

126 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

GPT-4 API Gray-Box Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Newly added APIs to large language models (LLMs), such as fine-tuning, function calling, and knowledge retrieval, introduce novel attack vectors that bypass existing safety mechanisms and enable various malicious activities. Specifically, fine-tuning with even a small number of carefully crafted examples can remove or weaken built-in safety guardrails, resulting in the generation of misinformation, disclosure of private information (PII), and the creation of malicious code. Function calling…

Exploiting novel gpt-4 apis
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Universal Jailbreak Backdoors

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A universal jailbreak backdoor vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) trained using Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). A malicious actor can poison the RLHF training data by introducing a trigger word into harmful prompts and labeling the harmful model outputs as preferred. This causes the LLM to generate harmful responses whenever the trigger word is included in any prompt, regardless of the prompt's content or topic. The backdoor is "universal" because it…

Universal jailbreak backdoors from poisoned human feedback
Evaluated models: Not reported

Fine-Tuning Bypasses RLHF

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning API of GPT-4 allows attackers to circumvent built-in RLHF safety mechanisms by fine-tuning the model with a relatively small number of carefully crafted prompt-response pairs. This enables the generation of harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities and the creation of dangerous materials, despite the base model's refusal to generate such content.

Removing rlhf protections in gpt-4 via fine-tuning
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

LoRA Bypass Safety Training

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Low-rank adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning allows efficient circumvention of safety training in large language models (LLMs), such as Llama 2-Chat 70B, resulting in significantly reduced refusal rates for harmful prompts while maintaining general performance capabilities. Attackers can use LoRA with a small, synthetic dataset of harmful instructions and responses to effectively undo safety measures implemented during the model's training.

Lora fine-tuning efficiently undoes safety training in llama 2-chat 70b
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 70B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat

Fine-tuning Compromises LLM Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Fine-tuning aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) on a small number of adversarially crafted examples, or even on benign datasets, can compromise their safety alignment, leading to the generation of harmful or inappropriate content. This vulnerability exploits the few-shot learning capabilities of LLMs, allowing attackers to override existing safety mechanisms with minimal effort and cost. Even unintentional fine-tuning with seemingly benign datasets can result in unintended safety degradation.

Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to!
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 70B Chat+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama-1

Chain-of-Utterance Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "Chain of Utterances" (CoU) based prompt injection attack. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to engage in multi-turn conversations and role-playing, tricking it into providing harmful or unsafe responses even when presented with safety guidelines. The attack leverages a crafted conversation between two agents ("Red-LM," a malicious agent, and "Base-LM," a seemingly helpful agent) to elicit unethical responses from the Base-LM by subtly…

Red-teaming large language models using chain of utterances for safety-alignment
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.