Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

122 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Distilled Jailbreak Prompt Generator

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Knowledge-Distilled Attacker (KDA) model, when used to generate prompts for large language models (LLMs), can bypass LLM safety mechanisms resulting in the generation of harmful, inappropriate, or misaligned content. KDA's effectiveness stems from its ability to generate diverse and coherent attack prompts efficiently, surpassing existing methods in attack success rate and speed. The vulnerability lies in the LLMs' insufficient defenses against the diverse prompt generation strategies…

KDA: A Knowledge-Distilled Attacker for Generating Diverse Prompts to Jailbreak LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 2.1, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+8 more
  • Claude 2.1
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Qwen 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

AD Black-Box Cascading Disruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a black-box adversarial attack method termed Cascading Adversarial Disruption (CAD). The vulnerability stems from the model's susceptibility to optimized visual perturbations that disrupt the decision-making reasoning chain (perception, prediction, and planning). Attackers can generate adversarial images or physical patches by aligning visual noise with deceptive textual semantics in the model's…

Black-box adversarial attack on vision language models for autonomous driving
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, InstructBLIP

Alignment-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for safety alignment are vulnerable to a novel "alignment-based" jailbreak attack. This attack leverages a best-of-N sampling approach with an adversarial LLM to efficiently generate prompts that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, without requiring additional training or access to the target LLM's internal parameters. The attack exploits the inherent tension between…

LIAR: Leveraging Alignment (Best-of-N) to Jailbreak LLMs in Seconds
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B, GPT-2, Llama 3.1 8B+6 more
  • Falcon 7B
  • GPT-2
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Megatron 345M
  • Mistral 7B
  • Pythia 12B
  • Tiny Llama 1.1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Adversarial Suffix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial suffix injection attacks. Maliciously crafted suffixes appended to otherwise benign prompts can cause the LLM to generate harmful or undesired outputs, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack leverages the model's sensitivity to input perturbations to elicit responses outside its intended safety boundaries.

GASP: Efficient Black-Box Generation of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Stochastic Monkey Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety alignment mechanisms are vulnerable to a bypass attack using simple, stochastic random augmentations of input prompts. The attack leverages the inherent brittleness of safety alignment to minor, randomly introduced modifications in the input, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs despite its safety training. Character-level augmentations prove significantly more effective than string insertions.

Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+12 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Phi 3 Medium 4k Instruct
  • Phi 3 Mini 4k Instruct
  • Phi 3 Small 8k Instruct
  • Qwen 2 0.5B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Zephyr 7B Beta

LLM Resource Exhaustion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack that exploits resource limitations. By overloading the model with a computationally intensive preliminary task (e.g., a complex character map lookup and decoding), the attacker prevents the activation of the LLM's safety mechanisms, enabling the generation of unsafe outputs from subsequent prompts. The attack's strength is scalable and adjustable by modifying the complexity of the preliminary task.

Harnessing Task Overload for Scalable Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B+5 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Vicuna7B-v0.3

Reinforcement Learning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

PathSeeker demonstrates a novel black-box jailbreak attack against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes multi-agent reinforcement learning. The attack iteratively modifies input prompts based on model responses, leveraging a reward mechanism focused on vocabulary expansion in the LLM's output to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. This technique bypasses existing safety filters by encouraging the model to relax its constraints, rather than directly targeting…

PathSeeker: Exploring LLM Security Vulnerabilities with a Reinforcement Learning-Based Jailbreak Approach
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek Chat, Deepseek-coder+14 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • Deepseek-coder
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemma2-8B-instruct
  • Glm-4-air
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B

LLM Data Poisoning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack paradigm, "jailbreak-tuning," which combines data poisoning with jailbreaking techniques to bypass existing safety safeguards. This allows malicious actors to fine-tune LLMs to reliably generate harmful outputs, even when trained on mostly benign data. The vulnerability is amplified in larger LLMs, which are more susceptible to learning harmful behaviors from even minimal exposure to poisoned data.

Data Poisoning in LLMs: Jailbreak-Tuning and Scaling Laws
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 (GPT-3.5-turbo-0125), GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 (GPT-3.5-turbo-0125)
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini (GPT-4o-mini-2024-07-18)
  • Yi 1.5

Agent Malfunction Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based autonomous agents are vulnerable to malfunction amplification attacks. These attacks exploit the inherent instability of agents by inducing repetitive or irrelevant actions through various methods including prompt injection and adversarial perturbations, leading to agent malfunction and task failure. The attacks do not rely on overtly harmful actions, making them harder to detect with standard LLM safety mechanisms.

Breaking agents: Compromising autonomous llm agents through malfunction amplification
Evaluated models: Claude 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Code-Switching LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit increased vulnerability to adversarial prompts employing code-switching techniques, where multiple languages are interwoven within a single query. This vulnerability stems from an unintended correlation between the resource availability of the languages used in the prompt and the LLM's safety alignment. LLMs trained on imbalanced multilingual data are more susceptible to attacks leveraging low-resource languages, resulting in a higher rate of unsafe or…

Code-Switching Red-Teaming: LLM Evaluation for Safety and Multilingual Understanding
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.