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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Gradient Shift Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to an inference-time jailbreak attack known as "Hybrid Gradient Shift." This vulnerability exploits the statistical discrepancy between an aligned model's output distribution and a pre-alignment reference distribution. By treating safety alignment as a form of miscalibration, an attacker can aggregate the logits of a target model (aligned), a helper model (unaligned/weak), and a predictor model to reconstruct the…

Jailbreaking LLMs via Calibration
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 120B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct

OCR Image Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) possessing Optical Character Recognition (OCR) capabilities are vulnerable to a "Text Distraction Jailbreaking" (Text-DJ) attack. The vulnerability exploits a gap between the model's visual text extraction and its safety alignment mechanisms. By converting a decomposed harmful textual query into images and embedding these images within a grid of semantically irrelevant "distraction" text images, an attacker can bypass safety filters. The model's OCR…

Text is All You Need for Vision-Language Model Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1 Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct

Unified Robustness Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • E5 BERT-base
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Skywork Reward V2

Adversarial Context Reasoning Brittleness

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) optimized via Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are vulnerable to context pollution in their reasoning traces. An attacker can induce catastrophic reasoning failure by injecting locally coherent but logically or mathematically corrupted snippets into the model's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or conditioning context. Because standard RLVR optimizes for final-answer correctness strictly under clean conditioning, the models treat the visible trajectory…

Learning Robust Reasoning through Guided Adversarial Self-Play
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, DeepScaleR 1.5B, Qwen 3 4B+1 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepScaleR 1.5B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B

Alignment Curse Jailbreak Transfer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

End-to-end multimodal large language models (omni-models) that utilize a shared representation space for text and audio are vulnerable to cross-modality jailbreak transfer, a phenomenon termed the "alignment curse." Because these models are trained to strongly align audio and text embeddings in their mid-to-late layers, an attacker can reliably bypass audio-specific safety mechanisms by converting mature, text-based jailbreak prompts into audio using standard Text-to-Speech (TTS) tools. When…

The Alignment Curse: Cross-Modality Jailbreak Transfer in Omni-Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5 3B

Attention Breaks Concept Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the internal representation mechanisms of Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-3 and Qwen series models. The vulnerability allows for high-accuracy "steering" of model outputs, effectively bypassing safety guardrails and refusal mechanisms (jailbreaking) without modifying model weights. By exploiting attention-guided feature learning, an attacker can extract a precise "concept vector" representing refusal behaviors. This is achieved by…

Efficient and accurate steering of Large Language Models through attention-guided feature learning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, Qwen 2.5 14B

Audio Narrative Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

End-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to paralinguistic jailbreak attacks where the acoustic delivery style of an input—specifically tone, prosody, and emotional framing—overrides safety alignment mechanisms. Unlike adversarial perturbations that inject noise, this vulnerability exploits the model's personification bias by utilizing standard Text-to-Speech (TTS) synthesis to render prohibited instructions in psychologically manipulative vocal styles (e.g…

Now You Hear Me: Audio Narrative Attacks Against Large Audio-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Realtime, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Diffusion Context Nesting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Diffusion Large Language Models (D-LLMs) are vulnerable to a "Context Nesting" attack that bypasses safety alignment mechanisms. While D-LLMs typically utilize a stepwise reduction effect during the iterative denoising process to suppress harmful content, this mechanism fails when harmful requests are embedded within benign, structured contexts. By wrapping a malicious query inside high-level structural templates (such as code completion, table filling, JSON, or YAML formats), an attacker can…

A Fragile Guardrail: Diffusion LLM's Safety Blessing and Its Failure Mode
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Emergent Character Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct, are vulnerable to emergent misalignment caused by "character-conditioned" fine-tuning. This vulnerability arises when models are fine-tuned on small datasets (e.g., 500 examples) that exhibit consistent behavioral dispositions (e.g., "Evil," "Sycophantic," or "Hallucinatory") rather than just incorrect facts. This process creates a latent control variable—defined as "character"—that governs model…

Character as a Latent Variable in Large Language Models: A Mechanistic Account of Emergent Misalignment and Conditional Safety Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 14B

Optimal Transport Bot Cloaking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based social bot detection systems are vulnerable to an Optimal Transport (OT)-guided evasion attack that manipulates local graph structures under realistic domain constraints. By modeling $k$-hop ego-neighborhoods as probability measures over spatio-temporal features, an attacker can compute an optimal transport plan to identify "cloak templates" (existing bots near the decision boundary that are misclassified as humans). The attacker can then decode this plan into…

Optimal Transport-Guided Adversarial Attacks on Graph Neural Network-Based Bot Detection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.