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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

406 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Evolutionary Language Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be exploited by the FORGEDAN evolutionary framework to bypass safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack, which operates in a black-box setting, uses a genetic algorithm to automatically evolve effective jailbreak prompts. The framework combines multi-strategy textual perturbations (at the character, word, and sentence levels) with a semantic fitness function based on RoBERTa embeddings. This allows it to iteratively…

FORGEDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemma 2 9B, Qwen 2.5 7B+2 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • RoBERTa
  • Transpec 13B

Black-Box Graph-Text Node Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) feature encoders with graph message-passing architectures, are vulnerable to a black-box node injection attack known as "GraphTextack." This vulnerability exists because the joint model architecture creates a dual attack surface: the GNN component is sensitive to structural perturbations (changes in graph topology), while the LLM component is sensitive to semantic perturbations (adversarial phrasing).

GRAPHTEXTACK: A Realistic Black-Box Node Injection Attack on LLM-Enhanced GNNs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

EvoSynth: Evolutionary Attack Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel class of jailbreak attacks generated through the evolutionary synthesis of executable, code-based attack algorithms. Unlike traditional methods that refine or combine static prompts, this technique uses an automated multi-agent system (EvoSynth) to autonomously engineer and evolve the underlying code that generates the attack. These generated algorithms exhibit high structural and dynamic complexity, using features like control flow, state…

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, GPT-4o+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Qwen Max

Multi-Agent Typo Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems employing ensemble sampling-and-voting strategies (specifically the "Agent Forest" framework) are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. While increasing the number of agents ($n \in \{1, \dots, 25\}$) improves accuracy on clean inputs, the system fails to mitigate the impact of synthetic punctuation noise and human-like typographical errors. Attackers can introduce surface-level perturbations—such as random punctuation insertion (10-50%…

More Agents Improve Math Problem Solving but Adversarial Robustness Gap Persists
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 3 4B+3 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Gemma 3 12B

RAG Poisoning Mitigation Downgrade

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A data poisoning vulnerability exists in the Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) component of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject adversarially perturbed text into the system's knowledge base. By employing a transfer-learning attack using a surrogate model (e.g., BERT) and word-level perturbation algorithms (e.g., TextFooler), an attacker can generate semantic-preserving descriptions that alter the vector…

RAG-targeted Adversarial Attack on LLM-based Threat Detection and Mitigation Framework
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Factual MitM Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, LLaMA-2-13B, Mistral-7B, and Phi-3.5-mini, are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) adversarial prompt injections that undermine factual recall. Termed the "$\chi$mera" (Chimera) attack framework, this vulnerability exists when an attacker intercepts and modifies user queries (e.g., via malicious browser extensions, compromised frontends, or proxy middleware) before they reach the victim model. By appending adversarial…

Injecting Falsehoods: Adversarial Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Undermining Factual Recall in LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Phi-3

Pervasive Multi-turn Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs)—specifically those prioritizing capability over safety alignment—exhibit a critical vulnerability to adaptive multi-turn prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. While these models effectively reject isolated, single-turn adversarial inputs (averaging ~13.11% Attack Success Rate), they fail to maintain safety guardrails and policy enforcement across extended conversational contexts. By leveraging iterative strategies such as "Crescendo" (gradual…

Death by a Thousand Prompts: Open Model Vulnerability Analysis
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Mistral Large 2+5 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large 2
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Phi-4
  • GLM 4.5 Air

Meta-Optimized LLM Judge Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for systematic jailbreaking through a meta-optimization framework called AMIS (Align to MISalign). The attack uses a bi-level optimization process to co-evolve both the jailbreak prompts and the scoring templates used to evaluate them.

Align to Misalign: Automatic LLM Jailbreak with Meta-Optimized LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude Sonnet 4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Adversarial Self-Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "adversarial conversational nudges," where the model abandons its internal factual knowledge to align with user-provided misinformation in closed domains (e.g., movies, books). Unlike standard hallucinations where a model lacks knowledge, this vulnerability occurs even when the model demonstrates—via separate self-consistency checks—that it correctly identifies the information as false. When a user creates a multi-turn context asserting…

What About the Scene With the Hitler Reference? HAUNT: A Framework to Probe LLMs' Self-consistency in Closed Domains Via Adversarial Nudge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5, Claude Opus 4+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Grok 4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.