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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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171 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agentic Prompt Leakage Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) where insufficient sanitization of system prompts allows attackers to extract sensitive information embedded within those prompts. Attackers can use an agentic approach, employing multiple interacting LLMs (as demonstrated in the referenced research), to iteratively refine prompts and elicit confidential data from the target LLM's responses. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the LLM's ability to infer context from seemingly innocuous…

Automating Prompt Leakage Attacks on Large Language Models Using Agentic Approach
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini

LLM Watermark Neutralization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking schemes based on n-gram probability biases (specifically KGW, SynthID-Text, MinHash, and SkipHash) are vulnerable to adversarial removal during Knowledge Distillation. When a student model is trained on the output of a watermarked teacher model, it inherits the watermark's statistical biases ("radioactivity"). An attacker can exploit this inheritance by comparing the student model's output token probabilities against a base model to extract the…

Can LLM Watermarks Robustly Prevent Unauthorized Knowledge Distillation?
Evaluated models: GLM 4 9B Chat, Llama 7B, Llama 3.2 1B

Agent Pipeline Simple Hacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial LLM-powered agents utilizing autonomous web access, memory modules, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and environmental manipulation. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into external data sources trusted by the agent (such as Reddit posts, public databases, or ArXiv papers). When the agent autonomously retrieves and processes this content during task execution, it executes the embedded malicious commands. This vulnerability…

Commercial llm agents are already vulnerable to simple yet dangerous attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Universal Magic Word Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in text embedding models used as safeguards for Large Language Models (LLMs). Due to a biased distribution of text embeddings, universal "magic words" (adversarial suffixes) can be appended to input or output text, manipulating the similarity scores calculated by the embedding model and thus bypassing the safeguard. This allows attackers to inject malicious prompts or responses undetected.

Jailbreaking LLMs' Safeguard with Universal Magic Words for Text Embedding Models
Evaluated models: E5 Base v2, Jina Embeddings v2, Nomic Embed+2 more
  • E5 Base v2
  • Jina Embeddings v2
  • Nomic Embed
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B
  • Sentence-T5 Base

Guardrail Bypass Harmful Fine-tuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

LLM Hate Campaign Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in hate speech detection systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and model stealing, resulting in evasion of hate speech detection. Adversarial attacks modify hate speech text to evade detection, while model stealing creates surrogate models that mimic the target system's behavior.

HateBench: Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors on LLM-Generated Content and Hate Campaigns
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2, Dolly 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo+2 more
  • Baichuan 2
  • Dolly 2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • OPT

LLM Risk Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • M3E
  • MiniLM

Adversarial Tool Injection Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool selection and execution process. This allows for privacy theft (extracting user queries), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against legitimate tools, and unscheduled tool-calling (forcing the use of attacker-specified tools regardless of relevance). The attack exploits vulnerabilities…

From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Obfuscated Activations Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate obfuscated activations, bypassing latent-space defenses such as sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Attackers can manipulate model inputs or training data to produce outputs exhibiting malicious behavior while remaining undetected by these defenses. This occurs because the models can represent harmful behavior through diverse activation patterns, allowing attackers to…

Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Llama 3 8B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.