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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Template and Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through an advanced jailbreaking technique called Template and Suffix Optimization (TASO). The attack combines two distinct optimization methods in an alternating, iterative feedback loop. First, a semantically meaningless adversarial suffix is optimized (e.g., using gradient-based methods like GCG) to force the LLM to begin its response with an affirmative phrase (e.g., "Sure, here is...")…

TASO: Jailbreak LLMs via Alternative Template and Suffix Optimization
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B, Baichuan 2 7B, DeepSeek 7B+27 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B
  • Baichuan 2 7B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Orca 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Solar 10.7B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Zephyr 7B

LLM App Malicious Drift

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Agent Automates Backdoor Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning process of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for the automated generation of stealthy backdoor attacks using an autonomous LLM agent. This method, termed AutoBackdoor, creates a pipeline to generate semantically coherent trigger phrases and corresponding poisoned instruction-response pairs. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that rely on fixed, often anomalous triggers, this technique produces natural language triggers that are contextually relevant and…

AutoBackdoor: Automating Backdoor Attacks via LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Conceptual Triggers Bypass Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models are vulnerable to a conceptual manipulation attack, termed Morphology Inspired Conceptual Manipulation (MICM), that bypasses standard safety filters to generate content aligned with harmful extremist ideologies. The attack does not use explicit keywords or standard jailbreak syntax. Instead, it embeds a curated set of seemingly innocuous phrases, called Concept-embedded Triggers (CETs), into a prompt template. These CETs represent an abstract "conceptual configuration" of…

When Harmless Words Harm: A New Threat to LLM Safety via Conceptual Triggers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-4o+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Evolutionary Language Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be exploited by the FORGEDAN evolutionary framework to bypass safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack, which operates in a black-box setting, uses a genetic algorithm to automatically evolve effective jailbreak prompts. The framework combines multi-strategy textual perturbations (at the character, word, and sentence levels) with a semantic fitness function based on RoBERTa embeddings. This allows it to iteratively…

FORGEDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemma 2 9B, Qwen 2.5 7B+2 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • RoBERTa
  • Transpec 13B

EvoSynth: Evolutionary Attack Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel class of jailbreak attacks generated through the evolutionary synthesis of executable, code-based attack algorithms. Unlike traditional methods that refine or combine static prompts, this technique uses an automated multi-agent system (EvoSynth) to autonomously engineer and evolve the underlying code that generates the attack. These generated algorithms exhibit high structural and dynamic complexity, using features like control flow, state…

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, GPT-4o+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Qwen Max

Pervasive Multi-turn Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs)—specifically those prioritizing capability over safety alignment—exhibit a critical vulnerability to adaptive multi-turn prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. While these models effectively reject isolated, single-turn adversarial inputs (averaging ~13.11% Attack Success Rate), they fail to maintain safety guardrails and policy enforcement across extended conversational contexts. By leveraging iterative strategies such as "Crescendo" (gradual…

Death by a Thousand Prompts: Open Model Vulnerability Analysis
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Mistral Large 2+5 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large 2
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Phi-4
  • GLM 4.5 Air

Meta-Optimized LLM Judge Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for systematic jailbreaking through a meta-optimization framework called AMIS (Align to MISalign). The attack uses a bi-level optimization process to co-evolve both the jailbreak prompts and the scoring templates used to evaluate them.

Align to Misalign: Automatic LLM Jailbreak with Meta-Optimized LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude Sonnet 4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Concurrent Task Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, known as Task Concurrency, exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability arises when two distinct tasks, one harmful and one benign, are interleaved at the word level within a single prompt. The structure of the malicious prompt alternates words from each task, often using separators like {} to encapsulate words from the second task. This "concurrent" instruction format obfuscates the harmful intent from the model's safety guardrails, causing the…

Adjacent Words, Divergent Intents: Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Task Concurrency
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4.1+7 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.