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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

131 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Confidence Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Verbal Confidence Elicitation (CEM)—where the model outputs a numeric confidence score (e.g., "Confidence: 90%") alongside an answer—are vulnerable to Verbal Confidence Attacks (VCAs). Adversaries can manipulate these confidence scores through two primary vectors: perturbation-based attacks (VCA-TF, VCA-TB, SSR) utilizing synonym substitution, typos, and token removal; and jailbreak-based attacks (ConfidenceTriggers, AutoDAN) utilizing optimized trigger…

On the Robustness of Verbal Confidence of LLMs in Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o3
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Airborne Audio LLM Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-based Large Language Models (ALLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio, are vulnerable to over-the-air adversarial audio attacks. An attacker with white-box access can generate robust adversarial audio perturbations using gradient-based optimization combined with audio augmentation techniques (specifically SpecAugment, translation, and additive noise). These perturbations, when played through a speaker in the physical environment, manipulate the ALLM processing the audio via a microphone. This…

Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-Agent Mole Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that allows a malicious agent to covertly disrupt collaborative decision-making processes without triggering standard safety filters or anomaly detection. This "intention-hiding" attack occurs when an agent adopts a persona that appears linguistically fluent and role-consistent but strategically steers the group toward incorrect outcomes or resource exhaustion. The attacker leverages specific semantic…

Who's the Mole? Modeling and Detecting Intention-Hiding Malicious Agents in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

LLM Judge Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Agent API Goal Divergence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents capable of invoking external APIs are vulnerable to intent integrity violations. When an agent receives natural language instructions that are ambiguous, underspecified, or contain values not supported by the underlying API schema, the agent frequently fails to preserve user intent. Instead of rejecting the request or asking for clarification, the model may hallucinate parameter values, map unsupported requests to unsafe defaults, or execute actions on…

TAI3: Testing Agent Integrity in Interpreting User Intent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B+5 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • o3-mini

JailFlip Implicit Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen Plus
  • Qwen Turbo

Breaking the LLM Reviewer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in automated peer review workflows are vulnerable to targeted textual adversarial attacks. By employing a technique defined as "Attack Focus Localization," an attacker can identify critical document segments via Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) matching between the original text and an initial LLM-generated review. Injecting semantic-preserving perturbations—such as character-level noise, synonym substitution (e.g., TextFooler), or stylistic transfer…

Breaking the Reviewer: Assessing the Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Automated Peer Review Under Textual Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.3 70B, Mistral Large

Chain-of-Code Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for code generation exhibit a vulnerability termed "Chain-of-Code Collapse" (CoCC), where the models fail to generate correct code when presented with semantically faithful but adversarially structured prompts. By applying transformations such as domain shifting (renaming variables/contexts), adding distracting constraints (irrelevant but plausible rules), or inverting objectives (negation), an attacker can cause the model to produce functionally incorrect…

Chain-of-Code Collapse: Reasoning Failures in LLMs via Adversarial Prompting in Code Generation
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.7 Sonnet+5 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek Coder 33B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.