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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Judge Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Agent API Goal Divergence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents capable of invoking external APIs are vulnerable to intent integrity violations. When an agent receives natural language instructions that are ambiguous, underspecified, or contain values not supported by the underlying API schema, the agent frequently fails to preserve user intent. Instead of rejecting the request or asking for clarification, the model may hallucinate parameter values, map unsupported requests to unsafe defaults, or execute actions on…

TAI3: Testing Agent Integrity in Interpreting User Intent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B+5 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • o3-mini

JailFlip Implicit Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen Plus
  • Qwen Turbo

Breaking the LLM Reviewer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in automated peer review workflows are vulnerable to targeted textual adversarial attacks. By employing a technique defined as "Attack Focus Localization," an attacker can identify critical document segments via Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) matching between the original text and an initial LLM-generated review. Injecting semantic-preserving perturbations—such as character-level noise, synonym substitution (e.g., TextFooler), or stylistic transfer…

Breaking the Reviewer: Assessing the Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Automated Peer Review Under Textual Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.3 70B, Mistral Large

Chain-of-Code Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for code generation exhibit a vulnerability termed "Chain-of-Code Collapse" (CoCC), where the models fail to generate correct code when presented with semantically faithful but adversarially structured prompts. By applying transformations such as domain shifting (renaming variables/contexts), adding distracting constraints (irrelevant but plausible rules), or inverting objectives (negation), an attacker can cause the model to produce functionally incorrect…

Chain-of-Code Collapse: Reasoning Failures in LLMs via Adversarial Prompting in Code Generation
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.7 Sonnet+5 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek Coder 33B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Semantic Prompt Distortion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Adaptive Greedy Binary Search (AGBS) framework exposes a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) regarding their susceptibility to semantic-preserving adversarial attacks. The vulnerability is exploited through a hierarchical decomposition strategy that identifies key semantic units (clauses and keywords) within a prompt. AGBS utilizes a dynamic threshold mechanism to adjust semantic similarity bounds in real-time during a beam search process, replacing tokens with candidates that…

Semantic-Preserving Prompt Hijacking: A Black-Box Adversarial Attack on Auto-Prompt Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+7 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 2 27B

Nonsensical CoT Reasoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting are vulnerable to input perturbations that decouple intermediate reasoning from the final answer. An attacker can generate adversarial examples using gradient-based optimization (targeting specific loss functions that maximize reasoning divergence while minimizing answer loss) to induce "Right Answer, Wrong Reasoning" behaviors. This vulnerability manifests through two primary attack vectors: 1. Token-level perturbations…

Robust Answers, Fragile Logic: Probing the Decoupling Hypothesis in LLM Reasoning
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Zephyr 7B Beta+4 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo

On-Device LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Judge LLM Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper Input Validation in Large Language Model (LLM) systems configured as automated evaluators ("LLM-as-a-judge") allows remote attackers to manipulate evaluation scores and comparative verdicts via adversarial prompt injection. The vulnerability arises when the model processes untrusted input containing linguistic masquerading, context separators, and disruptor commands (e.g., "Basic Injection", "Contextual Misdirection", and "Adaptive Search-Based Attack"). Successful exploitation…

Adversarial Attacks on LLM-as-a-Judge Systems: Insights from Prompt Injections
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Claude 3 Opus, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.