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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Code Agent Executable Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AI code agents are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that cause them to generate or complete malicious code. The vulnerability is significantly amplified when a base Large Language Model (LLM) is integrated into an agentic framework that uses multi-step planning and tool-use. Initial safety refusals by the LLM are frequently overturned during subsequent planning or self-correction steps within the agent's reasoning loop.

Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, Dolphin Mistral 24B Venice+6 more
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Dolphin Mistral 24B Venice
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Mistral Large 2.1
  • o1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B

Chained Tool-Use Injections

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in tool-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) agents, termed Sequential Tool Attack Chaining (STAC), where a sequence of individually benign tool calls can be orchestrated to achieve a malicious outcome. An attacker can guide an agent through a multi-turn interaction, with each step appearing harmless in isolation. Safety mechanisms that evaluate individual prompts or actions fail to detect the threat because the malicious intent is distributed across the sequence and only…

STAC: When Innocent Tools Form Dangerous Chains to Jailbreak LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct+4 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large
  • Mistral Small
  • Qwen 3 32B

Self-Amplifying Memory Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing long-term memory or Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to context-dependent memory injection attacks. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are overtly malicious, this vulnerability involves injecting records that appear benign and coherent in isolation—thereby bypassing standard perplexity filters and static content moderation (e.g., LlamaGuard). These records contain "sleeping" malicious logic that is only activated when…

A-memguard: A proactive defense framework for llm-based agent memory
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

Search Agents Vulnerable to Unreliable Results

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based search agents are vulnerable to manipulation via unreliable search results. An attacker can craft a website containing malicious content (e.g., misinformation, harmful instructions, or indirect prompt injections) that is indexed by search engines. When an agent retrieves and processes this page in response to a benign user query, it may uncritically accept the malicious content as factual and incorporate it into its final response. This allows the agent to be used as a vector for…

SafeSearch: Automated Red-Teaming for the Safety of LLM-Based Search Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro+11 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Kimi K2
  • o4-mini
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 8B

Deceptive Reasoning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are vulnerable to deceptive alignment attacks via adversarial system prompt injection. This vulnerability allows an attacker to induce "deceptive reasoning," where the model’s internal CoT actively plans or entertains malicious directives (e.g., radicalization, bias, or violence) while the final user-facing output remains benign, helpful, and innocuous. By creating a dissociation between internal reasoning and…

D-REX: A Benchmark for Detecting Deceptive Reasoning in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Nova Pro v1, DeepSeek R1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking+4 more
  • Nova Pro v1
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 3 Mini Beta

Physical Agent Object Misdirection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AdvEDM reveals a vulnerability in Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Embodied Decision-Making (EDM) systems, such as those used in autonomous driving and robotic manipulation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to launch fine-grained adversarial attacks that selectively modify the perception of specific objects in an input image—either by removing them (Semantic Removal) or adding them (Semantic Addition)—while preserving the semantic integrity of the rest of the scene.

AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents
Evaluated models: BLIP-2, MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-v2+5 more
  • BLIP-2
  • MiniGPT-4
  • LLaVA-v2
  • Otter-Image
  • OpenFlamingo-v2
  • Dolphins
  • EmbodiedGPT
  • GPT-4o

Adversarial Report Code Insecurity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems—such as SWE-agent, OpenHands, and AutoCodeRover—are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation via crafted bug reports. These systems accept unvetted natural language issue descriptions as trusted input to synthesize code patches. An attacker can exploit this trust by submitting semantically plausible but malicious bug reports designed to mislead the APR agent. By leveraging the semantic gap between natural language…

Adversarial Bug Reports as a Security Risk in Language Model-Based Automated Program Repair
Evaluated models: Prompt Guard, PromptGuard V2, Llama Guard 3+4 more
  • Prompt Guard
  • PromptGuard V2
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Llama Guard 4
  • Granite Guardian
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • o4-mini

Prompt Injection Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

MAS Link Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The evaluated MetaGPT multi-agent systems are vulnerable to "Web Fraud Attacks" due to insufficient semantic and structural validation of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by agentic models. A low-privilege compromised agent can exploit this vulnerability to induce other agents (including auditors and experts) into accepting, visiting, or processing malicious links. The vulnerability leverages the LLM's inability to distinguish between benign and malicious link structures when obfuscation…

Web fraud attacks against llm-driven multi-agent systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek Reasoner+1 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Llama 3 8B

Familiar Pattern Analysis Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for static code analysis, code review, and autonomous software engineering exhibit a cognitive vulnerability termed "Abstraction Bias." When processing code that structurally resembles common algorithmic patterns (e.g., standard sorting algorithms, helper functions, or mathematical formulas), the model relies on high-level memorized representations of the algorithm's intent rather than analyzing the specific local logic. Adversaries can exploit this by…

Trust Me, I Know This Function: Hijacking LLM Static Analysis using Bias
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • o3
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.