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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

262 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Template and Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through an advanced jailbreaking technique called Template and Suffix Optimization (TASO). The attack combines two distinct optimization methods in an alternating, iterative feedback loop. First, a semantically meaningless adversarial suffix is optimized (e.g., using gradient-based methods like GCG) to force the LLM to begin its response with an affirmative phrase (e.g., "Sure, here is...")…

TASO: Jailbreak LLMs via Alternative Template and Suffix Optimization
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B, Baichuan 2 7B, DeepSeek 7B+27 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B
  • Baichuan 2 7B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Orca 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Solar 10.7B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Zephyr 7B

LLM App Malicious Drift

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries
Evaluated models: Not reported

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Indirect Environmental Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen3-VL Plus
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4.5
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Conceptual Triggers Bypass Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models are vulnerable to a conceptual manipulation attack, termed Morphology Inspired Conceptual Manipulation (MICM), that bypasses standard safety filters to generate content aligned with harmful extremist ideologies. The attack does not use explicit keywords or standard jailbreak syntax. Instead, it embeds a curated set of seemingly innocuous phrases, called Concept-embedded Triggers (CETs), into a prompt template. These CETs represent an abstract "conceptual configuration" of…

When Harmless Words Harm: A New Threat to LLM Safety via Conceptual Triggers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-4o+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Evolutionary Language Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be exploited by the FORGEDAN evolutionary framework to bypass safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack, which operates in a black-box setting, uses a genetic algorithm to automatically evolve effective jailbreak prompts. The framework combines multi-strategy textual perturbations (at the character, word, and sentence levels) with a semantic fitness function based on RoBERTa embeddings. This allows it to iteratively…

FORGEDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemma 2 9B, Qwen 2.5 7B+2 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • RoBERTa
  • Transpec 13B

ITS Typography Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that combines image typography manipulation with multi-turn prompting. The vulnerability exploits the model's visual encoder and instruction-following capabilities by embedding a harmful textual query directly into a benign image as a visible caption (using specific fonts and blending techniques). An attacker then engages the model in a three-turn conversation: first asking a benign question about the visual object…

Jailbreaking Large Vision Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2 7B, LLaVA 7B

EvoSynth: Evolutionary Attack Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel class of jailbreak attacks generated through the evolutionary synthesis of executable, code-based attack algorithms. Unlike traditional methods that refine or combine static prompts, this technique uses an automated multi-agent system (EvoSynth) to autonomously engineer and evolve the underlying code that generates the attack. These generated algorithms exhibit high structural and dynamic complexity, using features like control flow, state…

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, GPT-4o+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Qwen Max

Speech-Audio Composition Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing speech and audio are vulnerable to Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks. This vulnerability exists because current safety mechanisms often rely on text-only transcription or fail to analyze the full acoustic context of an input. By manipulating the composition of audio signals, an attacker can bypass safety filters and elicit harmful responses. The attacks exploit three specific mechanisms: (1) Speech Overlap, where harmful…

Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks on Multimodal LLMs and Their Defense with SALMONN-Guard
Evaluated models: Qwen2-Audio 7B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Step-Audio 2 Mini Base+6 more
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Step-Audio 2 Mini Base
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6 8B
  • Qwen3-Omni 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Kimi-Audio 7B Instruct
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.