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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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35 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Lifecycle poisoning of reusable agent skills

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Evaluated models: all-MiniLM-L6-v2, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Query-Agnostic Poisoning of Policy-Aware RAG Knowledge Bases

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a specific, reproducible retrieval-layer poisoning issue: an adversary with knowledge-base write access can add semantically broad, cross-category policy rules that rank in top-k retrieval across varied queries without knowing runtime prompts. In the authors' isolated PA-LLM-RAG evaluation, one injected rule caused at least one poisoned rule to enter the LLM context for 17/20 prompts. Safe defensive reproduction should use a synthetic policy KB, synthetic benign prompts…

Knowledge Base Poisoning Attacks and Defense for Policy-Aware LLM-RAG Framework
Evaluated models: nomic-embed-text

Query-Agnostic Poisoning of Medical Multimodal RAG

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

M3Att demonstrates a reproducible knowledge-poisoning issue in medical multimodal RAG: an attacker with limited corpus-distribution knowledge can insert paired image-text entries whose visually perturbed images are broadly retrieved and whose clinically plausible misinformation steers downstream generation. The paper evaluates both white-box and black-box retrieval optimization and reports degraded diagnostic and report-generation utility across multiple datasets, retrievers, and LVLMs. These…

Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on Medical Multi-Modal Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5 Chat, Gemini 2.5 Flash+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • LLaVA Med
  • CLIP ViT-Large-Patch14-336
  • BGE-VL-base
  • SigLIP-SO400M-Patch14-384

Physical Infrared Semantic Disruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Infrared Vision-Language Models (IR-VLMs) allows attackers to systematically degrade open-ended semantic understanding—compromising classification, captioning, and Visual Question Answering (VQA)—via a physically deployable Universal Curved-Grid Patch (UCGP). Instead of manipulating explicit text labels, the attack disrupts the clean-category manifold in the model's visual representation space by maximizing orthogonal deviation energy from the principal subspace and forcing…

Revealing Physical-World Semantic Vulnerabilities: Universal Adversarial Patches for Infrared Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: InstructBLIP

X-Shaped Sparse VLM Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) relying on shared visual-textual representation spaces allows attackers to induce transferable cross-task semantic failures using an X-shaped Sparse Pixel Attack (XSPA). Attackers craft imperceptible adversarial perturbations restricted to a fixed geometric prior—two intersecting diagonal lines comprising approximately 1.76% of the image pixels. By jointly optimizing a classification objective with cross-task semantic guidance (target-semantic…

XSPA: Crafting Imperceptible X-Shaped Sparse Adversarial Perturbations for Transferable Attacks on VLMs
Evaluated models: InstructBLIP

VLM E-commerce Attack Surface

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLaVA-v1.5-7B, when deployed as a vision-language autonomous agent, is highly vulnerable to adversarial image perturbations. An attacker can inject imperceptibly modified images into a web environment (such as an e-commerce storefront). When the VLM agent captures a screenshot containing the perturbed image, the visual noise forces the model to misclassify the scene and output incorrect, structured JSON actions. This allows an attacker to hijack the agent's task execution, bypassing the user's…

Adversarial attacks against Modern Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, LLaVA 1.5 7B

Discrete Token Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Discrete image tokenizers are vulnerable to unsupervised embedding-space adversarial attacks. Attackers can apply $\ell_p$-bounded perturbations to an input image to maximize the $\ell_2$ distance of the pre-quantization continuous embeddings produced by the tokenizer's vision encoder. This forces the vector quantizer to cross discrete cell boundaries and assign incorrect codebook vectors, fundamentally altering the resulting token sequence. Because the attack targets the pre-quantization…

On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Retrieval Memory Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the similarity-based retrieval mechanisms of long-term memory-augmented Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically affecting systems like Mem0 and A-mem. The vulnerability arises from the system's reliance on dense embedding similarity (e.g., cosine similarity) to retrieve context from dynamic, user-generated memory banks without sufficient semantic validation or conflict resolution. An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit this by injecting "adversarial…

ER-MIA: Black-Box Adversarial Memory Injection Attacks on Long-Term Memory-Augmented Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 27B

Semantic Ensembles Fool CLIP

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) models are vulnerable to semantic-ensemble adversarial attacks. Current adversarial fine-tuning defenses for CLIP rely on minimizing the cosine similarity between an image and a single hand-crafted template (e.g., "A photo of a {label}"). This creates a vulnerability where adversarial examples (AEs) overfit to specific phrasings rather than the core class semantics. Attackers can bypass these defenses by generating semantic-aware adversarial…

Semantic-aware Adversarial Fine-tuning for CLIP
Evaluated models: CLIP ViT-B/32

LLM Scaling Fidelity Paradox

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) context compression architectures (specifically compressor-decoder setups) characterized as the "Size-Fidelity Paradox." When scaling up the parameter count of the compressor model (e.g., beyond 4B parameters in Qwen-3 and LLaMA-3.2 families), the system exhibits a degradation in faithful preservation of the source text, despite improvements in standard training loss and perplexity metrics. This degradation manifests through two primary…

When Less is More: The LLM Scaling Paradox in Context Compression
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B, Qwen 3 32B, Llama 3.2 11B+1 more
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Llama 3.2 90B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.