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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

99 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Retrieval Memory Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the similarity-based retrieval mechanisms of long-term memory-augmented Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically affecting systems like Mem0 and A-mem. The vulnerability arises from the system's reliance on dense embedding similarity (e.g., cosine similarity) to retrieve context from dynamic, user-generated memory banks without sufficient semantic validation or conflict resolution. An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit this by injecting "adversarial…

ER-MIA: Black-Box Adversarial Memory Injection Attacks on Long-Term Memory-Augmented Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 27B

Zombie Agent Persistence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Automated Stealth Skill Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in LLM-based coding agents that implement modular capability extensions (often referred to as "Agent Skills") where the agent dynamically loads and executes user-provided skill packages. The vulnerability allows for Skill-Based Prompt Injection, specifically leveraging a technique known as "SkillJect." This attack decouples the malicious intent from the operational payload to bypass semantic safety filters. An attacker constructs a skill package containing: 1. Inducement…

SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5 Mini, GLM-4.7+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.6
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • DeepSeek V4 Flash
  • GLM-5.1
  • MiniMax M2.7
  • MiMo V2.7
  • GPT-5.4
  • Claude Opus 4.6

RAG Knowledgebase Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Implicit Memory Covert Channel

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in environments with output reingestion (e.g., RAG, coding assistants, agentic workflows) that allows attackers to execute "temporal backdoors" (time bombs) via an implicit memory channel. Attackers can implant this behavior via system prompts or fine-tuning (data poisoning) to make the model encode hidden state information within its generated text using non-printing Unicode characters or semantic steganography. When these…

Position: Stateless Yet Not Forgetful: Implicit Memory as a Hidden Channel in LLMs
Evaluated models: o3-mini, o4-mini, GPT-oss 120B+7 more
  • o3-mini
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5.2
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 3 4B IT

Personalized Agent Double Agent

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), Tool-Return Manipulation, and Persistent Memory Poisoning. The agent incorporates untrusted external content (e.g., fetched web pages) and external tool outputs directly into its observation stream without sufficient isolation. An attacker can embed malicious payloads into these external channels to hijack the agent's planning and execution trace. This allows the attacker to silently trigger high-privilege actions via OpenClaw's Skills…

From Assistant to Double Agent: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks on OpenClaw for Personalized Local AI Agent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Clinical Prompt Injection Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems deployed in clinical workflows are vulnerable to direct and indirect (RAG-mediated) medical prompt injection attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions within user queries or external retrieved documents (such as poisoned clinical guidelines or PDFs). By exploiting "authority framing" (e.g., formatting the payload as a clinical guideline update or an editor's note), the injections successfully bypass generic…

MPIB: A Benchmark for Medical Prompt Injection Attacks and Clinical Safety in LLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct+10 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Mixtral 8x22B v0.1
  • MedGemma 4B
  • MedGemma 27B
  • Meditron 7B
  • Meditron 70B
  • BioMistral 7B
  • MMed-Llama 3 8B

Context-Robust RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a robust corpus poisoning attack known as "Confundo." This vulnerability arises from the lack of pipeline awareness in standard RAG implementations, specifically regarding document ingestion (tokenization and chunking) and query variations. An attacker can exploit this by fine-tuning a Large Language Model (LLM) to function as a poison generator. Unlike traditional adversarial examples which are brittle, Confundo generates poison…

Confundo: Learning to Generate Robust Poison for Practical RAG Systems
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemini Pro

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

Safety Steering Amplifies Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Inference-time intervention techniques (also known as activation steering or model steering), utilized to adjust Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without retraining, contain a vulnerability related to robust specificity. When these methods are applied to reduce "over-refusal" (increasing compliance on benign but sensitive-sounding queries), they inadvertently degrade the model's adversarial robustness. Specifically, steering vectors derived from methods such as Difference-in-Means…

Steering Safely or Off a Cliff? Rethinking Specificity and Robustness in Inference-Time Interventions
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 3B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 2B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.