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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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23 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Logit-Forced Knowledge Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with accessible output logits are vulnerable to "coercive interrogation," a novel attack that extracts harmful knowledge hidden in low-ranked tokens. The attack doesn't require crafted prompts; instead, it iteratively forces the LLM to select and output low-probability tokens at key positions in the response sequence, revealing toxic content the model would otherwise suppress.

Make them spill the beans! coercive knowledge extraction from (production) llms
Evaluated models: Code Llama 13B Instruct, Codellama-13B-python, GPT-3.5+7 more
  • Code Llama 13B Instruct
  • Codellama-13B-python
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct
  • GPT-3.5-turbo-instruct-0914
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Yi-34B

GPT-4v System Prompt Leakage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A system prompt leakage vulnerability in GPT-4V allows extraction of internal system prompts through carefully crafted, incomplete conversations combined with image input. Extracted prompts can be used as highly effective jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety restrictions and leading to undesirable outputs, including revealing personally identifiable information from images.

Jailbreaking gpt-4v via self-adversarial attacks with system prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4V, LLaVA 1.5

AutoDAN: Interpretable LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AutoDAN is an interpretable gradient-based adversarial attack that generates readable prompts to bypass perplexity filters and jailbreak LLMs. The attack crafts prompts that elicit harmful behaviors while maintaining sufficient readability to avoid detection by existing perplexity-based defenses. This is achieved through a left-to-right token-by-token generation process optimizing for both jailbreaking success and prompt readability.

Autodan: Automatic and interpretable adversarial attacks on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Pythia 12B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.