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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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11 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Deleted agent memory persists in live execution state

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Deleting a memory record can leave its information in an agent's summaries, pending plans and KV cache. The paper evaluates revocation across this derived execution state.

Forgetting Without Restarting: Execution-State Unlearning for Stateful LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Context privilege escalation in AI agent harnesses

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Context assembly can promote repository, tool or skill content into higher-priority instructions or persistent state. The paper studies 12 pinned agent-harness versions.

What's in Your Agent's Context? Context Privilege Escalation Attacks against AI Agent Harness
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, GPT-5.4-mini, Claude Sonnet 4.6+4 more
  • GPT-5.5
  • GPT-5.4-mini
  • Claude Sonnet 4.6
  • Claude Opus 4.6
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • DeepSeek V4 Flash

Single-interaction poisoning of agent memory

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A stored interaction can later steer a memory-augmented agent's answer without direct memory-store access. The study evaluates persistent response manipulation in MemoryOS and MemGPT.

InjecMEM: Memory Injection Attack on LLM Agent Memory Systems
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct+3 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Workspace Agent Runtime Safety Failures Across Risk Carriers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AgentS4D measures unsafe actions and state changes across complete workspace-agent executions rather than treating task completion or isolated model responses as safety evidence. Its 328 sandboxed cases introduce risky content through user requests, documents, web resources, tools, third-party skills, and persistent memory, then compare the same cases across four agent harnesses and five model backends.

AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, DeepSeek V4-Pro+2 more
  • GPT-5.5
  • Gemini 3.1 Pro
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro
  • MiniMax-M3
  • Qwen3.7-Plus

Long-Context Enterprise Agent Policy Adherence Failures

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

HANDBOOK.md measures whether an agent can apply detailed organizational rules while completing realistic, multi-step enterprise tasks. The vendor-authored benchmark includes 65 resettable MCP-backed workflows, policy documents of 20 to 124 pages, and 824 deterministic rubric checks covering required decisions, prohibited actions, and final environment state.

HANDBOOK.md: A Benchmark for Long-Context Agentic Instruction Following
Evaluated models: Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 4.8+16 more
  • Claude Fable 5
  • GPT-5.6 Sol
  • Claude Opus 4.8
  • GPT-5.5
  • Grok 4.5
  • Muse Spark 1.1
  • GLM 5.2
  • Kimi K3
  • Gemini 3.5 Flash
  • Claude Sonnet 4.6
  • Gemini 3.1 Pro
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro
  • Qwen 3.7 Max
  • DeepSeek V4 Flash
  • Kimi-K2.6
  • Gemini 3.6 Flash
  • Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite
  • Grok 4.3
  • Nemotron 3 Ultra

Persistent Agent Memory Poisoning and Incomplete Repair

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.

MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, DeepSeek V4-Pro, MiniMax-M3

Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skills

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Self-evolving agent-skill systems may promote recurring, attacker-controlled execution records into persistent reusable instructions. The paper evaluates whether poisoned but task-plausible trajectories survive aggregation and appear in generated skill artifacts, using inert canary behaviors and two structurally different skill-evolution pipelines.

When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-5.4, MiniMax M2.5, DeepSeek V3.2+3 more
  • GPT-5.4
  • MiniMax M2.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro
  • Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
  • Qwen3.5-122B-A10B

Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper presents a specific black-box indirect prompt-injection evaluation: attacker-controlled external content can cause a memory-enabled assistant or external memory manager to persist a fabricated user memory, which may later be retrieved in a separate session and steer responses or agent actions. The authors evaluate injection, retrieval, and conditional adversarial usage separately across synthetic document and future-session datasets. The released repository provides defensive…

Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.4, GPT-5.5, Claude Sonnet 4.6+3 more
  • GPT-5.4
  • GPT-5.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4.6
  • Gemini 3.1 Pro
  • Kimi-K2.6
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro

Long-Term Memory Authority Laundering

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible agent-memory poisoning issue: untrusted content stored in persistent memory can later influence consequential actions after its origin is laundered through agent summarization, trusted-tool echo, or manufactured corroboration. The paper reports that content scoring, lineage, and single-session capability/IFC defenses remain vulnerable because they decide authority from malleable content or derivation signals. This is a paper-reported evaluation; it was not…

Securing LLM-Agent Long-Term Memory Against Poisoning: Non-Malleable, Origin-Bound Authority with Machine-Checked Guarantees
Evaluated models: GPT-5 Chat, GPT-4o Mini, Claude Opus 4.1+5 more
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B

Persistent Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes and evaluates a reproducible application-layer weakness in agents with persistent memory: untrusted external content can cross the memory-write boundary, be stored as trusted factual, experience, or procedural memory, and influence later sessions. It identifies four write channels—explicit writes, policy-driven writes, compaction, and experience-to-procedure synthesis—and six attack classes. For safe defensive testing, use MPBench’s two-phase structure in an isolated agent…

From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 120B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.