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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Chain-of-Utterance Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "Chain of Utterances" (CoU) based prompt injection attack. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to engage in multi-turn conversations and role-playing, tricking it into providing harmful or unsafe responses even when presented with safety guidelines. The attack leverages a crafted conversation between two agents ("Red-LM," a malicious agent, and "Base-LM," a seemingly helpful agent) to elicit unethical responses from the Base-LM by subtly…

Red-teaming large language models using chain of utterances for safety-alignment
Evaluated models: Not reported

Code-Switching LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit increased vulnerability to adversarial prompts employing code-switching techniques, where multiple languages are interwoven within a single query. This vulnerability stems from an unintended correlation between the resource availability of the languages used in the prompt and the LLM's safety alignment. LLMs trained on imbalanced multilingual data are more susceptible to attacks leveraging low-resource languages, resulting in a higher rate of unsafe or…

Code-Switching Red-Teaming: LLM Evaluation for Safety and Multilingual Understanding
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Red Teaming Framework

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to craft malicious prompts that induce the LLM to generate harmful content, such as fraudulent material, racist remarks, or instructions for illegal activities. The vulnerability arises from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious instructions disguised within seemingly innocuous prompts. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging techniques like obfuscation, code injection/payload splitting, and…

Attack prompt generation for red teaming and defending large language models
Evaluated models: Not reported

RL-Based LLM Privacy Leak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel agentic-based red-teaming attack, PrivAgent, which uses reinforcement learning to generate adversarial prompts. These prompts can extract sensitive information, including system prompts and portions of training data, from target LLMs even with existing guardrail defenses. The attack leverages a custom reward function based on a normalized sliding-window word edit similarity metric to guide the learning process, enabling it to overcome the…

PrivAgent: Agentic-based Red-teaming for LLM Privacy Leakage
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Memory Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to inject malicious demonstrations into the agent's memory or knowledge base. By crafting a carefully optimized trigger, an attacker can manipulate the agent's retrieval mechanism to preferentially retrieve these poisoned demonstrations, causing the agent to produce adversarial outputs or take malicious actions even when seemingly benign prompts are used. The attack, termed…

Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • text-embedding-ada-002

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.