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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Robotic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Nvidia Dolphins Self-driving Llm

Diffusion-Driven LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

DiffusionAttacker exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing manipulation of prompts to elicit harmful responses, even when the model incorporates safety mechanisms. The attack leverages a sequence-to-sequence diffusion model to rewrite harmful prompts, making them appear harmless to the LLM's internal representation while preserving their original semantic meaning. This bypasses safety filters and elicits undesired outputs.

DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • Alpaca 7B
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Implicit Clue Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an indirect jailbreak attack, termed "Puzzler," which leverages implicit clues instead of explicit malicious intent in prompts. By providing associated behaviors or hints related to a malicious query, Puzzler elicits malicious responses from the LLM, bypassing its safety mechanisms. The attack works by first obtaining "defensive measures" from the LLM against a target malicious action, then querying for the corresponding "offensive measures" that…

Play guessing game with llm: Indirect jailbreak attack with implicit clues
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+3 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 13B
  • Llama 7B

LLM Refusal Suppression Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that exploit their tendency to refuse harmful requests. The "Don't Say No" (DSN) attack overcomes this refusal mechanism by optimizing prompts to suppress negative responses, increasing the likelihood of generating harmful content. This is achieved by modifying the loss function during adversarial prompt optimization, prioritizing the suppression of refusal keywords over the elicitation of affirmative responses. The attack…

Don't Say No: Jailbreaking LLM by Suppressing Refusal
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Multi-Turn Crescendo Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the "Crescendo" multi-turn jailbreak attack. This attack uses a series of benign, escalating prompts to gradually lead the LLM into generating harmful or disallowed content, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to follow conversational patterns and build upon previous responses, making it difficult to detect based solely on individual prompts.

Great, now write an article about that: The crescendo multi-turn llm jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+6 more
  • Claude 2
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemini Ultra
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Chat

Instruction Tuning Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL) algorithm allows adversaries to inject backdoor triggers into instruction-tuning datasets for Large Language Models (LLMs). These triggers, appended to the input content without altering the instruction or label, cause the LLM to generate a pre-determined malicious response during inference, even with minimal poisoned training data (e.g., 1%). The triggers maintain low perplexity, making them difficult to detect by standard filtering…

Learning to poison large language models during instruction tuning
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 11B, Flan-T5 3B, Llama 2 13B+1 more
  • Flan-T5 11B
  • Flan-T5 3B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B

Visual Adversarial Tool Abuse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools. Adversarial images, visually indistinguishable from benign images, can manipulate the LLM to execute unintended tool commands, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user resources. The attack is effective across diverse prompts, remaining stealthy both in the image itself and in the generated text response.

Misusing tools in large language models with visual adversarial examples
Evaluated models: Not reported

Activation-Steering LLM Trojan

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Trojan Activation Attack (TA²) against Large Language Models (LLMs) allows injection of "trojan steering vectors" into activation layers during inference. These vectors, generated by comparing activations from a target LLM and a "teacher" (misaligned) LLM, steer the model's output towards attacker-defined misaligned behaviors (e.g., generating toxic content, biased responses, or helpful instructions for harmful activities). The attack does not require retraining or modifying model weights.

Backdoor activation attack: Attack large language models using activation steering for safety-alignment
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B, GPT-3 13B, Llama 2 13B+4 more
  • Falcon 7B
  • GPT-3 13B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Vicunav1.5 13B
  • Vicunav1.5 7B

GPT-4 API Gray-Box Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Newly added APIs to large language models (LLMs), such as fine-tuning, function calling, and knowledge retrieval, introduce novel attack vectors that bypass existing safety mechanisms and enable various malicious activities. Specifically, fine-tuning with even a small number of carefully crafted examples can remove or weaken built-in safety guardrails, resulting in the generation of misinformation, disclosure of private information (PII), and the creation of malicious code. Function calling…

Exploiting novel gpt-4 apis
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

LLM Version Fingerprinting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated into applications reveal unique behavioral fingerprints through responses to crafted queries. LLMmap exploits this by sending carefully constructed prompts and analyzing the responses to identify the specific LLM version with high accuracy (over 95% in testing against 42 LLMs). This allows attackers to tailor attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities specific to the identified LLM version.

Llmmap: Fingerprinting for large language models
Evaluated models: Aya-23-8B, Cohere-35B, GPT-4+9 more
  • Aya-23-8B
  • Cohere-35B
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • OpenChat 3.5
  • Phi-3-medium-28k-instruct
  • Phi 3 Medium 4k Instruct
  • Smaug-llama-3-70B-instruct
  • Solar-10.7B-instruct-v1.0

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.